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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court properly denied appellants' Motion to Compel

Arbitration because the arbitration agreement appellants seek to enforce is invalid due to
their failure to comply with Utah Code § 78B-3-421's requirement that the patient must
be verbally encouraged to: (1) read both the arbitration agreement and certain written
information that must be provided to the patient, and (2) ask questions.

1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code § 78B-3-421. Arbitration Agreements
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a health
care provider to be validly executed or, if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not
been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed:
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing, the following information on:
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate a claim instead of having the claim
heard by a judge or jury;
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in which arbitrators are selected under the
agreement;
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs under the agreement;
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into the agreement and still receive health
care if Subsection (3) applies;
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each year unless the agreement is canceled in
writing before the renewal date;
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about the arbitration agreement answered;
(vii) the right of the patient to rescind the agreement within 10 days of signing the
agreement; and
(viii) the right of the patient to require mediation of the dispute prior to the arbitration of
the dispute;
(b) the agreement shall require that:
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(i) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b)(ii), a panel of three arbitrators shall be
selected as follows:
(A) one arbitrator collectively selected by all persons claiming damages;
(B) one arbitrator selected by the health care provider; and
(C) a third arbitrator:
(I) jointly selected by all persons claiming damages and the health care provider; or
(II) if both parties cannot agree on the selection of the third arbitrator, the other two
arbitrators shall appoint the third arbitrator from a list of individuals approved as
arbitrators by the state or federal courts of Utah; or
(ii) if both parties agree, a single arbitrator may be selected;
(iii) all parties waive the requirement of Section 78B-3-416 to appear before a hearing
panel in a malpractice action against a health care provider;
(iv) the patient be given the right to rescind the agreement within 10 days of signing the
agreement;
(v) the term of the agreement be for one year and that the agreement be automatically
renewed each year unless the agreement is canceled in writing by the patient or health
care provider before the renewal date;
(vi) the patient has the right to retain legal counsel;
(vii) the agreement only apply to:
(A) an error or omission that occurred after the agreement was signed, provided that the
agreement may allow a person who would be a proper party in court to participate in an
arbitration proceeding;
3

(B) the claim of:
(1) a person who signed the agreement;
(II) a person on whose behalf the agreement was signed under Subsection (6); and
(III) the unborn child of the person described in this Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B), for 12
months from the date the agreement is signed; and
(C) the claim of a person who is not a party to the contract if the sole basis for the claim
is an injury sustained by a person described in Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B); and
(c) the patient shall be verbally encouraged to:
(i) read the written information required by Subsection (l)(a) and the arbitration
agreement; and
(ii) ask any questions.
(2) When a medical malpractice action is arbitrated, the action shall:
(a) be subject to Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act; and
(b) include any one or more of the following when requested by the patient before an
arbitration hearing is commenced:
(i) mandatory mediation;
(ii) retention of the jointly selected arbitrator for both the liability and damages stages of
an arbitration proceeding if the arbitration is bifurcated; and
(iii) the filing of the panel's award of damages as a judgement against the provider in the
appropriate district court.
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(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be denied health care on the sole
basis that the patient or a person described in Subsection (6) refused to enter into a
binding arbitration agreement with a health care provider.
(4) A written acknowledgment of having received a written explanation of a binding
arbitration agreement signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a defense to a claim
that the patient did not receive a written explanation of the agreement as required by
Subsection (1) unless the patient:
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the capacity to do so; or
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the agreement was
induced by the health care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or
fraudulent omission to state material facts.
(5) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a binding
arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3, 1999.
(6) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 78B-3-406(6), except a person
temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration
agreement on behalf of a patient.
(7) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement that is subject to the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charles Bova, M.D., performed a lumbar nerve root injection on Glenna Stewart
on April 16, 2008 at Pioneer Valley Hospital. Both Dr. Bova and the hospital were
negligent in performing this procedure. Glenna Stewart suffered serious injuries as a
direct result of this negligence.
This medical malpractice action was filed by Glenna Stewart against Dr. Bova and
the hospital on January 7, 2009. Dr. Bova filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration on
February 18, 2009. Pioneer Valley Hospital joined this motion on February 19, 2009. The
arbitration agreement that Dr. Bova and the hospital seek to enforce is invalid for a
variety of reasons. Most importantly for purposes of this appeal, both Dr. Bova and the
hospital failed to verbally encourage Glenna Stewart to (1) read both the arbitration
agreement and certain written information that must be provided to the patient, and (2)
ask questions. Utah Code § 78B-3-421 provides that an arbitration agreement is not
"validly executed" unless this "verbal encouragement" requirement is met.
The parties briefed this issue and presented arguments to the trial court in three
different hearings held on June 15, 2009, October 19, 2009, and December 10, 2009. The
trial court denied the Motion to Compel Arbitration due to appellants' failure to comply
with § 78B-3-421's verbal encouragement provision. This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Charles Bova, M.D., performed a lumbar nerve root injection on Glenna

Stewart on April 16, 2008. (R40; R46.)
2.

This procedure was performed at Pioneer Valley Hospital. (R40; R46.)
6

3.

Dr. Bova and Pioneer Valley Hospital were negligent in performing the

lumbar nerve root injection, and Glenna Stewart suffered serious injuries as a direct result
of this negligence. (R1-R4.)
4.

Glenna Stewart's daughter, Mickie Jo Stewart, accompanied her on the day

of the procedure. (R40; R46.) Mickie Jo Stewart is a nurse. (R40; R45.)
5.

After arriving at the hospital, Glenna Stewart and her daughter waited

approximately 30 minutes in the waiting area. (R41; R46.)
6.

Glenna Stewart and her daughter were then taken to a room that contained

four hospital beds separated by curtains. (R41; R46.)
7.

Glenna Stewart and her daughter then waited in this room for

approximately an hour and a half. (R41; R46.) Glenna Stewart changed into a hospital
gown during this time. (R41; R46.)
8.

Glenna Stewart suffered considerable pain and anxiety during this extended

time waiting for Dr. Bova. (R41; R46.)
9.

Glenna Stewart asked the nurse several times to speak with the doctor

before the injection; Glenna's daughter also asked the nurse that Glenna be able to speak
with the doctor before the injection. (R41; R46.) However, Glenna Stewart did not have
an opportunity to speak with Dr. Bova before the injection. (R42.)
10.

A nurse came into the room with a stack of papers and instructed Glenna

Stewart to sign them. (R41; R46.)
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11.

Glenna Stewart told the nurse that somebody else's name appeared on the

top page of this stack of papers; the nurse then took the papers and said that she would be
rightback.(R41;R47.)
12.

The nurse returned with a stack of papers, and she pointed to the specific

pages where Glenna Stewart was supposed to sign. (R42; R47.)
13.

Glenna Stewart signed the papers while the nurse waited. (R42; R47.)

14.

The nurse told Glenna Stewart to hurry because Dr. Bova would be there

any minute. (R42; R47.)
15.

After waiting for approximately two hours, Glenna Stewart was taken to yet

another room and placed on a table in preparation for the injection. (R42; R47.)
16.

Just before Dr. Bova arrived to perform the injection, a nurse came into the

room with another paper for Glenna Stewart to sign. (R42; R47.)
17.

Glenna Stewart had no opportunity to read this document that she signed in

the procedure room. (R42; R47.)
18.

Neither Dr. Bova nor any other person gave Glenna Stewart a verbal

explanation of any of the documents that she signed. (R42; R47.)
19.

Neither Dr. Bova nor any other person asked Glenna Stewart if she had any

questions. (R42; R47.)
20.

Neither Dr. Bova nor any other person verbally encouraged Glenna Stewart

to ask questions regarding any of the documents she signed. (R42; R47.)
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21.

Neither Dr. Bova nor any other person gave Glenna Stewart copies of any

of the documents that she signed. On the contrary, both Glenna Stewart and her daughter
distinctly remember leaving the hospital that day without any papers. (R42; R47-R48.)
22.

Mickie Jo Stewart is familiar with healthcare providers' practice of having

their patients sign arbitration agreements. (R45.) Mickie Jo has always advised her family
members to refuse to sign these agreements. (R45.) If Mickie Jo had known that there
was an arbitration agreement in the documents provided to Glenna Stewart to sign,
Mickie Jo would have instructed her mother not to sign it. (R47.)
23.

Dr. Bova finally appeared to perform the injection. When he came into the

procedure room, Dr. Bova called Glenna Stewart by the wrong name and acted like he
was in a hurry. (R42.)
24.

Dr. Bova seemed confused about what area he was supposed to inject when

he performed the injection. (R42.)
25.

Dr. Bova now asserts that Glenna Stewart signed an arbitration agreement

before he performed the injection on April 16, 2008. (R119; R122-R123.) The arbitration
agreement asserted by Dr. Bova is not dated. (R122-R123.)
26.

Dr. Bova now claims that he: (1) "reviewed the arbitration agreement ...

with Mrs. Stewart and one of her family members," (2) "answered any of Mrs. Stewart's
questions regarding the arbitration agreement," and (3) "confirmed that Mrs. Stewart
understood the terms of the arbitration agreement and that if we had a dispute related to
the procedure, the dispute would be addressed in arbitration." (Rl 19.)
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27.

Dr. Bova also relies on memo—that he prepared—that

asserts:

"Additionally the patient read the arbitration agreement. I reviewed it with them so that
they understood that if we had a dispute it would be settled with arbitration. Concerning
these two documents, all questions were answered and the patient freely gave consent to
proceed by signing their signature." (R. 125.)
28.

The asserted arbitration agreement contains the following language:

Article 9 Acknowledgement of Written Explanation of Arbitration
I have received a written explanation of the terms of this Agreement. I have
had the right to ask questions and have my questions answered....
Article 10 Receipt of Copy I have received a copy of this document.
(R123.) However, the arbitration agreement is silent regarding whether the patient has
been verbally encouraged to: (1) read the arbitration agreement and any other written
information provided to her, and (2) ask any questions. (R122-R123.)
29.

Dr. Bova's counsel admitted in a hearing in the trial court that Dr. Bova has

no evidence that Glenna Stewart was verbally encouraged to: (1) read the arbitration
agreement and any other written information provided to her, and (2) ask any questions.
(R336,p.21.)
30.

Similarly, Counsel for Appellants admit in their brief that "there is no

specific extrinsic evidence that Plaintiff

was verbally encouraged." (Brief of

Defendants/Appellants Charles Bova, M.D., and Pioneer Valley Hospital at 21.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
An arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care provider is not valid
under Utah law unless the patient is verbally encouraged to: (a) read both the arbitration
agreement and certain written information that must be provided to the patient, and (b)
ask questions. See Utah Code § 78B-3-421(l)(c). The appellants failed to comply with
this "verbal encouragement" requirement. Therefore, the arbitration agreement they seek
to enforce was not "validly executed," and the trial court properly rejected the appellants'
Motion to Compel Arbitration.
Section 78B-3-421—particularly the "verbal encouragement" requirement—is
unambiguous. Therefore, it must be enforced according to its plain meaning. Moreover, §
78B-3-421's "verbal encouragement" provision imposes requirements that go above and
beyond the common law of contracts. Utah law is clear that the common law must yield
when it conflicts with a statute like § 78B-3-421.
Finally, the appellants' arguments in favor of reversal each lack merit. The parol
evidence rule does not prevent a party from presenting extrinsic evidence that a contract
is invalid. Also, any burden involved in proving compliance with the "verbal
encouragement" provision does not justify violating § 78B-3-421. Likewise, § 78B-3-421
protects patients from unconscionable arbitration agreements; requiring healthcare
providers to fully comply with § 78B-3-421 will not undermine it.
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ARGUMENT
A. Arbitration Agreements Between Patients and Health Care
Providers Must Comply With Utah Code § 78B-3-421
An "arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care provider" is not
valid under Utah law unless it fully complies with Utah Code § 78B-3-421. Section 78B3-421 requires health care providers to: (1) provide certain information to patients in
writing, (2) include certain terms in the arbitration agreement itself, and (3) "verbally
encourage" the patient to: (a) read both the required written information and the
arbitration agreement, and (b) "ask any questions." Id. at (l)(a)-(c).
An arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care provider that fails to
meet each of these requirements is not "validly executed." See id. Thus, in Soriano v.
Graul, 2008 UT App 188, <][10, 186 P.3d 960, this Court invalidated an arbitration
agreement between a patient and a health care provider that did not comply with § 78B-3421. Soriano invalidated an arbitration agreement due to the parties' failure, at the time of
automatic renewal, to "renew the Agreement to reflect the legislative changes"
introduced by 2004 amendments to § 78B-3-421.
The detailed requirements for arbitration agreements between patients and health
care providers imposed by § 78B-3-421 are unambiguous. Therefore, the requirements of
§ 78B-3-421 must be enforced according to their plain meaning. "Under our established
rules of statutory construction, [Utah courts] look first to the plain meaning of the
pertinent language in interpreting [a statute]; only if the language is ambiguous do we
consider other sources for its meaning." Otter Creek Reservoir Co. v. New Escalante
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Irrigation Co., 2009 UT 16, (J[14, 203 P.3d 1015; see also Harvey v. Cedar Hills City,
2010 UT 12, 115, 227 P.3d 256 ("We 'seek guidance from the legislative history and
relevant policy considerations' only if the statutory language is ambiguous or unclear").
Moreover, § 78B-3-421 imposes requirements that go above and beyond common
law principles recognized by Utah courts governing the validity of contracts. The Utah
State Legislature acknowledged this fact when it passed the 2004 amendments to § 78B3-421. See Soriano, 2008 UT App 188 at \9 (quoting legislative debates in which
legislators draw a distinction between: (1) health care providers, who are subject to §
78B-3-421, and (2) members of "every other profession," who "can require mandatory
arbitration" without complying with § 78B-3-421.)
Utah Courts "have long held that where a conflict arises between the common law
and a statute ..., the common law must yield." Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, ^[16 n.6,
160 P.3d 1041. Moreover, "the legislature has clearly stated that Utah statutes that
contradict the common law are not to be interpreted narrowly." Id. Thus, Utah Code § 633-2 provides in part:
(1) The rule of the common law that a statute in derogation of the common
law is to be strictly construed does not apply to the Utah Code.
(2) A statute of the Utah Code establishes the law of this state respecting
the subjects to which the statute relates.
(3) Each provision of, and each proceeding under, the Utah Code shall be
construed with a view to effect the objects of the provision and to promote
justice.
Therefore, § 78B-3-421(l)(c)'s verbal encouragement provision must be enforced
according to its terms. The Court should rale that an arbitration agreement is not "validly
executed" if the health care provider failed to "verbally encourage" the patient to: (a) read
13

both the required written information and the arbitration agreement, and (b) "ask any
questions." Id. at (l)(c).
B. The Arbitration Agreement Is Invalid Under § 78B-3-421 Because
Defendants Failed to 'Verbally Encourage' Ms. Stewart
The arbitration agreement in this case was not "validly executed" because the
appellants failed to "verbally encourage" the appellee to: (a) read both the required
written information and the arbitration agreement, and (b) "ask any questions."1
The appellants were obligated to present "direct and specific evidence" that a valid
arbitration agreement exists. McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31,
^[17, 20 P.3d 901. This standard applies because "parties to binding arbitration waive
substantial rights to formal adjudication of their disputes." Id. Thus, Bybee v. Abdulla,
2008 UT 35, 127, 189 P.3d 40 ruled: "[w]hile there is a presumption in favor of
arbitration, that presumption applies only when arbitration is a bargained-for remedy of
the parties as evidenced by direct and specific evidence of a contract to arbitrate"
(quotation marks omitted). Appellants have failed to present "direct and specific"
evidence that they complied with § 78B-3-421's "verbal encouragement" requirement. Of
course, whether an agreement to arbitrate is valid and enforceable is a question of law.
See Soriano, 2008 UT App 188 at f][4, 10; see also Bybee, 2008 UT 35 at f7 ("Whether a
contract requires a party to arbitrate is a question of law").
Glenna Stewart disputes that she signed the arbitration agreement, which is
undated, before undergoing the treatment at issue. Ms. Stewart also contends that the
arbitration agreement is invalid because: (1) she was not given a copy of the arbitration
agreement; (2) she was not given the written information required by §78B-3-421(l)(a);
and (3) the arbitration agreement is unconscionable. However, the trial court has not
ruled on these issues.
14

Declaration of Glenna Stewart. Glenna Stewart testified in her declaration that
on April 16, 2008, a Pioneer Valley Hospital nurse presented her with a stack of papers
and told her where to sign. (R41.) Glenna Stewart was suffering pain and anxiety at the
time, and she had been waiting for Dr. Bova to show up for an extended period of time.
(R42.) The nurse told Glenna Stewart to hurry because Dr. Bova would be there any
minute. (R42.) A nurse presented Glenna Stewart with another document just before Dr.
Bova performed the injection. (R42.) Glenna Stewart did not have an opportunity to read
this document. (R42.)
Both Glenna Stewart and her daughter requested that Glenna be allowed to speak
with Dr. Bova before he performed the injection. (R41; R46.) However, Glenna Stewart
did not have a chance to speak with Dr. Bova, who was rushed and apparently confused
as he performed the injection. (R42.)
No one—not Dr. Bova or any other person—gave to Glenna Stewart a verbal
explanation of any of the documents that she signed. (R42.) Neither Dr. Bova nor any
other person asked Glenna Stewart if she had any questions about the documents. (R42.)
Neither Dr. Bova nor any other person verbally encouraged Glenna Stewart to ask
questions about any of the documents she signed. (R42.) Finally, neither Dr. Bova nor
any other person gave Glenna Stewart copies of the documents she signed. On the
contrary, both Glenna Stewart and her daughter distinctly remember leaving the hospital
that day without any papers. (R42.)
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Declaration of Mickie Jo Stewart. Mickie Jo Stewart's declaration confirms each
of the key facts in Glenna Stewart's declaration. (R46-48.) Furthermore, Mickie Jo
Stewart testified that: (1) she always advises family members not to sign arbitration
agreements presented by healthcare providers, and (2) she would have advised her
mother not to sign if she had known that an arbitration agreement was included in the
documents presented to her mother to sign. (R45; R47.)
Declaration of Charles Bova, M.D. Dr. Bova claims in his declaration that he:
(1) "reviewed the arbitration agreement ... with Mrs. Stewart and one of her family
members," (2) "answered any of Mrs. Stewart's questions regarding the arbitration
agreement," and (3) "confirmed that Mrs. Stewart understood the terms of the arbitration
agreement and that if we had a dispute related to the procedure, the dispute would be
addressed in arbitration." (R119.) However, Dr. Bova's declaration is notable for what it
lacks: evidence that he complied with § 78B-3-421's "verbal encouragement"
requirement.
Dr. Bova also relies on a memorandum that asserts: "Additionally the patient read
the arbitration agreement. I reviewed it with them so that they understood that if we had a
dispute it would be settled with arbitration. Concerning these two documents, all
questions were answered and the patient freely gave consent to proceed by signing their
signature." (R.125.) Again, this memorandum says nothing about compliance with §
78B-3-421's "verbal encouragement" requirement.

This Memorandum is hearsay mired in indicia of doubtful reliability. Dr. Bova
prepared this memorandum himself. The memo is unusual for a medical record because it
16

The Arbitration Agreement. The contract that appellants seek to enforce does
not claim that appellants complied with § 78B-3-421's "verbal encouragement"
requirement. At most, the arbitration agreement contains this language: "I have received a
written explanation of the terms of this Agreement. I have had the right to ask questions
and have my questions answered. ... I have received a copy of this document."
These boilerplate acknowledgements conflict with the facts surrounding the
alleged execution of the arbitration agreement. Setting aside this troubling inconsistency,
these boilerplate acknowledgements simply do not say anything about § 78B-3-421's
"verbal encouragement" requirement. On the contrary, this language appears to be a
reference to other requirements of § 78B-3-421, including the requirement that the patient
must be notified in writing of her "right ... to have questions about the arbitration
agreement answered." See § 78B-3-421(l)(a)(vi).
Opposing Counsel's Concessions. Counsel for appellants admit in their brief that
"there is no specific extrinsic evidence that Plaintiff was verbally encouraged." (Brief of
Defendants/Appellants Charles Bova, M.D., and Pioneer Valley Hospital at 21.) Indeed,
Dr. Bova's counsel admitted to the trial court that Dr. Bova has no evidence that Glenna
Stewart was verbally encouraged to: (1) read the arbitration agreement and any other
written information provided to her, and (2) ask any questions. (R336, p.21.)

lacks any reference to the date and time of dictation or transcription—or the identity of
the transcriber. Also, the language at issue (referring to the patient as "them" and "their")
appears to be awkward boilerplate language that could easily be cut and pasted into all
such documents regardless of what happened when Dr. Bova treated Ms. Stewart on
April 16, 2008.
17

There is no evidence that appellants complied with § 78B-3-421's 'Verbal
encouragement" requirement. Therefore, the Court should affirm the trial court's ruling
that the arbitration agreement at issue was not "validly executed."
C. The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Prevent Full Enforcement of
§78B-3-421
The Court should reject appellants' argument that the parol evidence rule prevents
the Court from considering evidence outside of the contract to determine whether the
contract complies with § 78B-3-421. Of course, § 78B-3-421—including particularly its
"verbal encouragement" provision—imposes requirements that go beyond the common
law of contracts. Accordingly, general common law principles do not prevent courts from
considering evidence to ensure compliance with these additional statutory requirements.
See Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26 at \\6 n.6 (ruling that Utah Courts "have long held that where
a conflict arises between the common law and a statute ..., the common law must yield.")
Appellants' argument seems to fundamentally misunderstand the scope and
purpose of the parol evidence rule, which does not apply here:
as a principle of contract interpretation, the parol evidence rule has a very
narrow application. Simply stated, the rule operates, in the absence
of fraud or other invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered for
the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract.
Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, \\1, 182 P.3d 326.
The parol evidence rule does not apply to this case because appellee has not
attempted to "vary" or "add to" the terms of the arbitration agreement by presenting to
the Court "contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements." Indeed,
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appellee has never asked the Court to alter any of the contract's unambiguous terms
based on such outside-of-the-contract evidence. On the contrary, appellee contends that
the entire arbitration agreement was not "validly executed" due to appellants' failure to
comply with § 78B-3-421's "verbal encouragement" requirement.
The parole evidence rule acknowledges that a party may present evidence outside
of the contract to demonstrate that the contract itself is invalid. Thus, Tangren qualified
its definition of the parol evidence rule with the phrase "in the absence of fraud or other
invalidating causes." Tangren a t ^ l l . Tangren ruled:
Where a contract by an explicit term purports to be integrated, we will
nevertheless allow extrinsic evidence in support of an argument that the
contract is not, in fact, valid for certain reasons that we have specified. We
have held that extrinsic evidence is appropriately considered, even in the
face of a clear integration clause, where the contract is alleged to be a
forgery, a joke, a sham, lacking in consideration, or where a contract is
voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, or illegality. By their very nature, these
bases for invalidation of a contract are not necessarily provable by
reference to the contract itself. Moreover, these bases are not necessarily
inconsistent with an explicit agreement that a contract constitutes the
complete understanding of the parties. In other words, a written contract
could purport to constitute the complete understanding of the parties, yet
nevertheless be invalid because it is a forgery, a joke, a sham, or the result
of fraud, duress, mistake, or illegality.
Id. at <j[15 (footnotes omitted). Tangren also adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS

§ 214 (1979), which also broadly defines the "other invalidating causes" that

a party may attempt to prove by presenting extrinsic evidence to the trial court. Section
214 provides in part: "Agreements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the
adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish ... illegality, fraud, duress,
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lack of consideration, or other invalidating cause." Moreover, comment c to §214
observes:
What appears to be a complete and binding integrated agreement may be a
forgery, a joke, a sham, or an agreement without consideration, or it may be
voidable for fraud, duress, mistake, or the like, or it may be illegal. Such
invalidating causes need not and commonly do not appear on the face of the
writing.
Failure to comply with § 78B-3-421's "verbal encouragement" requirement is an
invalidating cause. Thus, the parol evidence rule does not prevent the Court from
considering evidence to determine compliance with § 78B-3-421.
Appellants' parole evidence rule argument would lead to absurd results. Boiled
down to its core, appellants' argument is this: no matter how strong the evidence that a
contract is invalid, the Court must take the contract—and only the contract—at face
value. Thus, appellants contend that certain language in the contract (e.g. "I have
received a written explanation of the terms of this Agreement. ... I have received a copy
of this document") prevents appellee from presenting evidence that, despite the contract's
boilerplate acknowledgements, she did not receive either: (1) a copy of the agreement, or
(2) a written explanation of the agreement.
As the trial court observed, appellant's parole evidence rule argument is circular in
a way that could undermine contracts to the detriment of both parties. (R336, p. 17.)
Indeed, counsel for Dr. Bova agreed with the trial court that "[i]f the agreement says that
[appellee] will be flown to the moon," it doesn't necessarily mean "that she will be flown
to the moon[.]" (R336, p. 14.) Clearly, Utah Courts may consider extrinsic evidence
when a contract is challenged as invalid.

Section 78B-3-421 requires Utah courts to consider the details surrounding the
execution of an arbitration agreement between a healthcare provider and a patient. Yet
appellants argue that the common law parole evidence rule prohibits Utah courts from
considering such evidence. However, § 78B-3-421 "establishes the law of this state
respecting the subjects to which the statute relates," See Utah Code § 63-3-2. The parole
evidence rule does not prevent the full enforcement of § 78B-3-421.
D. Sosa Does Not Apply to the Trial Court's § 78B-3-421 Ruling; The
Contract Is Unconscionable Under Sosa
Appellants' argument that Sosa v. Pernios, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996), applies to
this appeal is incorrect. Sosa was decided before the 2004 amendments to §78B-3-421 at
issue. Obviously, therefore, Sosa does not discuss § 78B-3-421's "verbal encouragement"
requirement that forms the basis of the trial court's ruling. Moreover, the trial court did
not even rule on appellee's defense that the arbitration agreement is invalid due to
unconscionability. Thus, appellants appear to be inviting the Court to resolve factual
issues for the first time on appeal. However, "weighing the evidence is the responsibility
of the trial court." Fisher v. Fisher, 2009 UT App 305, <I[14, 221 P.3d 845.
Of course, Sosa ruled that "elements of procedural unconscionability surrounded
the negotiation" of an arbitration agreement between a doctor and his patient. Id. at 36263. Sosa based this ruling on the following: (1) the arbitration agreement was presented
to the patient "minutes away from surgery when she was already in her surgical clothing
and in a state of fear and anxiety," (2) the patient "felt 'rushed and hurried' to sign the
documents and thus did not read them," (3) "[t]he agreement was on a printed form and
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was drafted by [the doctor], who was in a much stronger bargaining position," and (4)
"[n]either [the doctor] nor any member of his staff discussed the arbitration agreement
with Ms. Sosa at time that or at any other time prior to surgery. No one explained to her
the options of not signing and discussing the matter further with [the doctor]." Id. at 363.
The Utah Supreme Court in Sosa remanded the case to the trial court to determine
whether Ms. Sosa: (1) was given a copy of the arbitration agreement, and (2) whether she
was somehow precluded from exercising her contractual right to revoke the agreement.
Id. at 364-65. Sosa concluded: "[i]f the trial court determines that [Ms. Sosa] did not
receive a copy of the agreement or was precluded from exercising her right to revoke, the
trial court's original determination that the entire agreement is unconscionable is
affirmed." M a t 365.
If the Court chooses to apply Sosa to this case, it should rule that the arbitration
agreement is invalid due to procedural unconscionability based on the following facts: (1)
the documents Glenna Stewart signed were presented to her minutes before the injection
when Ms. Stewart was in a hospital gown and suffering from serious pain and anxiety
(R41-R42; R46-R47), (2) Glenna Stewart felt rushed to sign the documents and did not
read them (R42; R47), (3) the arbitration agreement that Ms. Stewart allegedly signed
was part of a stack of forms supplied by Dr. Bova, who was in a much stronger
bargaining position (R41-R42; R46-R47), (4) neither Dr. Bova nor any other person
discussed the agreement with Glenna Stewart (R41-R42; R46-R47), and (5) Glenna
Stewart was not given a copy of the alleged arbitration agreement (R42; R47-R48).
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E. The Burden of Proving Compliance With § 78B-3-421 Does Not
Excuse Violation of § 78B-3-421
Appellants argue that the burden of proving compliance with the "verbal
encouragement" requirement is so onerous that the Court simply cannot enforce § 78B-3421. Appellants even resort to hyperbole, claiming that proving "verbal encouragement"
imposes on healthcare providers "a burden of proof that is simply impossible to meet."
On the contrary, there is nothing unusually difficult—let alone impossible—about
proving compliance with § 78B-3-421. Healthcare providers seeking to enforce
arbitration agreements subject to § 78B-3-421 have access to all of the standard tools and
methods that parties use to prove facts in court.
Appellants also argue that: (1) enforcing § 78B-3-421's "verbal encouragement"
provision according to its plain meaning may result in fewer arbitration agreements being
enforced, and (2) this potential for invalidation of some arbitration agreements is a
sufficient reason for the Court to disregard the plain language of § 78B-3-421. In making
this argument, appellants' refuse to acknowledge that § 78B-3-421 is "the law of this
state respecting the subjects to which the statute relates." Utah Code §63-3-2(2). When it
enacted § 78B-3-421, the Utah Legislature made the policy judgment that arbitration
agreements must meet certain requirements to be "validly executed." Thus, § 78B-3-421
expressly envisions the invalidation of non-compliant agreements. "When the legislature
has spoken clearly on an issue, [Utah courts] are not free to second-guess its wisdom on
grounds of policy." Cornell v. Corwell 2008 UT App 49, <][12, 179 P.3d 821. Indeed, this
Court is obligated to "construe each act of the legislature so as to give it full force and
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effect." Thomas Edison Charter School v. Retirement Bd., 2008 UT App 221, ^[11, 189
P.3d 79. To do so in this case, the Court should uphold the trial court's enforcement of
the 'Verbal encouragement" provision of § 78B-3-421.
F. Section 78B-3-421 Should Be Enforced in Light of Its Patient
Protection Purpose
Finally, appellants argue that the general purpose of the statute in question
compels the Court to refuse to enforce § 78B-3-421's "verbal encouragement" provision.
Appellants seem to argue that the statute at issue exists to protect healthcare providers
from their patients. This reading is particularly odd in light of § 78B-3-421, which
imposes detailed requirements that protect patients from unconscionable arbitration
agreements such as the contract discussed in Sosa, The Court will not undermine § 78B3-421 by requiring appellants to fully comply with that statute.
If anything threatens to undermine § 78B-3-421, it is appellants' demand to be
excused from the "verbal encouragement" requirement. Indeed, if appellants' failure to
comply with § 78B-3-421's "verbal encouragement" provision is permissible, other
healthcare providers may be emboldened to test the limits of § 78B-3-421 to determine
what level of non-compliance is acceptable. The Court should refuse to condone and
encourage violation of § 78B-3-421 in this manner.
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CONCLUSION
The arbitration agreement that appellants seek to enforce is invalid because
appellants failed to comply with § 78B-3-421's "verbal encouragement" requirement.
Appellants concede that they failed to present evidence of compliance with the "verbal
encouragement" requirement. Still, appellants' urge the Court to ignore § 78B-3-421's
plain language and disregard this failure. However, § 78B-3-421 protects patients from
potentially unconscionable arbitration agreements, and it should be enforced accordingly.
There is nothing unusual or unduly burdensome about requiring appellants to prove their
compliance with the "verbal encouragement" requirement. Finally, the parol evidence
rule does not prevent appellee from presenting extrinsic evidence that the arbitration
agreement is invalid. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial
court's denial of appellants' Motion to Compel Arbitration.
DATED this _^[_ day of July, 2010.
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